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1. Introduction
In spite of the abundant research on the relation between spillovers and the optimal outcome of co-
operation in R&D versus non-co-operative set-ups, and the well-acknowledged increasing occurrence
of co-operative agreements, the fact that firms could manage and increase spillovers through R&D co-
operation has hardly been addressed empirically.
In this paper, we will show that the rationale for a policy of promoting R&D co-operation depends on
the theoretical perspective that is endorsed, and on the magnitude and nature of spillovers, a matter
that is still open to empirical scrutiny.
Public policies that are entirely based on conclusions from analysing existing national value added
linkages may be more inward- and backward looking than those which also consider (inter)national
collaborative patterns, that will partly shape the future economic and technological space.
Up to now, previous studies on the proxy measurement of spillovers focused mainly on supplier-buyer
linkages or on patent data.
We have computed knowledge spillovers, using the linkages between firms that have been established
in the EU through ‘pre-competitive’ collaborative R&D.
The European Framework Programmes (FWPs) is undoubtedly the most basic and popular mechanism
through which public-funded collaborative research has been performed in Europe during the last two
decades.
We have found that the pattern of intra- and intersectoral spillovers is country specific, more so for
user sectors than for supplier sectors, and cannot simply be fitted in the value added chain.
The degree of intrasectoral spillovers is found to be relatively high and surprisingly significantly
higher in large countries than in smaller countries.
This is a finding that should be examined more thoroughly as it could indicate collusive behaviour.
Because of the ‘pre-competitive’ nature of the FWP projects and the theoretical advantages of co-
operation at the R&D stage, this finding should not immoderately warn us against collusion, although
there are some indications that the FWPs may have reinforced the oligopolistic tendency of the
European IT market.
We argue that the mapping of R&D collaboration allows for a rather straightforward measurement of
knowledge spillovers, that can complement or readjust some of the conclusions that have resulted
from other methodologies.
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32. How embodied are knowledge spillovers ?
Technological or R&D spillovers are most often strictly defined as externalities (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1992) although more recent definitions also comprise the v luntary exchange of useful
knowledge (e.g. Steurs, 1994; Llerena and Matt, 1999; Rycroft and Kash 1999; and De Bondt, 1999).
In his review of preceding research on R&D spillovers, Griliches (1992) concludes that, in spite of a
considerable number of methodology and data constraints, studies generally seem to confirm the
presence and relative magnitude of R&D spillovers.
Griliches makes the distinction between two notions of R&D spillovers.
He qualifies spillovers to be 'embodied' if they relate to the purchase of equipment, goods and
services. Embodied spillovers can also be defined as rent spillovers to the extent that improvements-
resulting from one firm’s efforts- in the products that are sold to other firms are not fully absorbed by
a concurring price increase.
Embodied spillovers are generally measured through input-output tables- amplified with survey data
or data on R&D expenditures- or flows of international trade (Terleckyj 1974; Coe and Helpman
1995; OECD 1999 a).
Although the importance of supplier-buyer linkages for innovation is well-established (Debresson et
al. 1997 ; Christensen, Rogaczewska and Vinding 1999; OECD 1999 b) innovative networks are also
often found to be too complex to be reduced to value added chains.  
Because, as pointed out by Debresson (1999), innovative networks often straddle nations and
encompass foreign partners, the use of available R&D collaboration data can broaden the framework
of interfirm networking by focusing both on national and international linkages whereas I/O analysis is
mostly confined to national or regional networking.
Debresson and Hu (1999) find that I/O-based methods are in general not very reliable for small, open
economies and are limited to mapping innovative activities within the « old eco omic space ».3
If public policy would only draw conclusions from this kind of analysis, it will probably be more
inward- and backward looking than a policy that also considers indications as to the direction in which
the international technological space will evolve.
An I/O-based policy may also run the risk of promoting inefficient and collusive lock-in situations.
We argue that an I/O-based approach is perhaps appropriate to analyse incremental changes, which
undoubtedly are very important, but probably will take place, with or without any government
support4.
More breakthrough innovations, however, resulting from new combinations of complementary
technological knowledge are rather unlikely to be grasped by existing value added links.
The high uncertainty involving fundamental innovations and their great welfare increasing
consequences seem, far more than for incremental innovations, to call for specific policy measures and
support.
Analysing (pre-competitive) R&D networking can be instrumental in this policymaking process, as
well as in assessing the impact of network promoting policies.
Disembodied spillovers are seen by Griliches (1992: p. S 36) as “ [... ] ideas borrowed by research
teams of industry i from the research results of industry j. It is not clear that this kind of borrowing is
particularly related to input purchase flows" and are in his view more significant than embodied
spillovers.
According to Griliches, the main problem with computing knowledge spillovers is an accurate
definition of the technological proximity or closeness between firms, as an inverse relationship
between spillovers and technological distance may be expected.
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on R&D expenditures to patent data.
 Jaffe (1986, 1989) proposes a method to characterize the technological position of a firm based on
patent data, which allows for the detection of technologically related firms. In Jaffe’s view the
magnitude of spillovers is a function of the technological distance between firms.
He uses the distribution of firms’ patents over patent classes and defines the spillover pool as the
weighed sum of all other firms’ R&D, with the weights proportional to the technological proximity,
and finds evidence of a positive effect of technologically close firms’ R&D on the productivity of own
R&D.
Verspagen (1997) points to the importance of intersectoral spillovers to argue that the magnitude of
spillovers between firms is not necessarily related to their ‘technological similarity’.
In our view, technological proximity is a better proxy for the absorptive capacity of firms than it is for
the spillover between firms, certainly if voluntary spillovers are substantial.
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) propose a model in which complementarity of knowledge is an
important parameter in the value of useful information sharing. If research discoveries of partners are
perfect complements, which is most often assumed, progress will be optimal.
If partners’ discoveries are perfect substitutes there is a total overlap and no useful information can be
shared.
Rycroft and Kash (1999) argue that networks are very effective mechanisms for incorporating tacit
(i.e. non-codified) knowledge. Co-operation therefore seems a somewhat neglected channel for
knowledge spillovers. This can probably to a large extent be explained by the fact that most scholars
define spillovers as externalities and thereby do not consider voluntary ‘spillovers’.
We are well aware that innovative networks entail far more then R&D networking, as the former also
relate to the commercial exploitation of the results of R&D activities, and innovation does not always
imply R&D activities.
Rycroft and Kash (1999) rightly warn against the danger of a policy overemphasis on R&D.
Throughout this paper we use the terms co-operation and networking intertwined. It is obvious that
firms that have no other co-operative agreement, apart from their involvement in a single FWP project,
can questionably be regarded as network agents. Our focus will however be on those firms and sectors
that actively and frequently co-operate and are assumed do so from a strategic appreciation of their
partners’ contribution to a relatively clearly defined collaboration.
3. Rationale for a public policy of promoting R&D co-operation
Llerena and Matt (1999) show that the rationale for a policy of promoting interfirm co-operation in
R&D depends on the theoretical perspective of the policymaker.
If a market or transaction cost stance is adopted, co-operation is often regarded as an (unstable)
exception to competition.
The FWPs of the EU (see section 4) have been set up as block exemptions- dictated by the specific
nature of pre-competitive R&D- to the strict EU competition rules.
However, the European Commission also promotes the follow-up of participation in its FWP by near-
market collaboration in EUREKA projects5, and thereby somewhat bends its own competition rules.
The US policy towards R&D co-operation in the early 1980s also consisted, apart from changes to
intellectual property rigths, in a relaxation of antitrust regulation. Similar concerns as in the EU about
loss of international competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan urged US policymakers to judge research
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5partnerships no longer merely on their static collusive effects, but also on their dynamic benefits
(Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000 : pp. 580-81).
From a more evolutionary perspective, interfirm agreements are considered to be a powerful
coordination mechanism to create and diffuse knowledge within a vast, complex and rapidly evolving
technological space.
Where public policy, following the traditional perspective, is concerned with adjusting market failures,
the latter perspective demands policymakers to consider evolutionary failures, related to learning
processes, lock-in and negative externalities  (Llerena and Matt, 1999 : pp.188-94).
The extensive game-theoretical research that followed from d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
originated the view that co-operation at the R&D stage and competition at the subsequent production
stage results in a social welfare optimum. Given the nature of R&D activities (non-excludability,
uncertainty and inappropriability) market resource allocation will not be socially optimal. Policy can
resolve this market failure through promoting co-operation, subsidies and intellectual property rights.
These findings were seen as support of the EU FWPs and national policies of promoting R&D
collaboration.
However, the theoretical support for such policies is not that straightforward.
Amir (2000) compares the models that followed the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin (AJ) publication to the
model proposed by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992).  Amir argues that the AJ models conflict with
the stylized fact that industry R&D levels are decreasing in the spillover rate. The KMZ models
confirm this stylized fact and therefrom Amir concludes that the AJ model is not very valid, especially
for large spillovers, i.e. precisely for those situations that in the AJ model  justify policy support.
From the viewpoint of the strategic investment literature, R&D competition is more optimal than
collaboration if spillovers are small, and when spillovers are large the private and social welfare
optimum coincide and public subsidies will not elicit many additional R&D activities. Publicly
subsidized programmes of R&D collaboration are in this case only appropriate if spillovers are
asymmetric (i.e. if there is sufficient diversity between firms in research capabilities).
If spillovers are differentiated between voluntary and involuntary the welfare results, and hence the
policy conclusions, are not as clear either (Ll rena and Matt, 1999 : pp. 182-86).
Cassiman and Veugelers (1998) point out that the fact that firms could manage spillovers within and
through R&D co-operation, has hardly been adressed empirically.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Nelson (1992) and Teece (1992) have argued that tacit knowledge does
not, contrary to the idea of knowledge as a public good, spill over effortlessly. Co-operation may
increase knowledge flows between partners and can allow partners to internalize spillovers. In most
theoretical models spillovers are exogenous to the decision to co-operate or not. Cassiman and
Veugelers (1998) review some of the models that do acknowledge that partners may voluntarily
increase spillovers between them.
The model proposed by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), in which spillovers are endogenized,  predicts
that firms from different sectors will fully share information, even if no co-operative agreement is
concluded. From the finding of Katsoulacos (1993) that most R&D co-operation in the FWPs were
between firms in different sectors they conclude that the EU subsidies to share information probably
had a low additionality effect. Contrary to the findings of Katsoulacos (1993) the spillovers that we
have computed show a high degree of intrasectoral co-operation (see section 6).
Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996) show that the EU policy instrument of cost subsidies may be
counterproductive for knowledge sharing and that patent subsidies could be more effective.
This argument seems extremely forceful, as combined with the point raised by Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998), this suggests that at present the EU RTD policy supports projects that would occur anyway
6and discourages projects that would induce significant disclosure of knowledge, and that not so much
the policy rationale, but the policy focus and instrument are wrong.
Anyhow, irrespective of which theoretical perspective is endorsed, the magnitude and specificities of
spillovers are crucial for the rationale of a public policy towards promoting R&D collaboration, and
this matter is still open to empirical scrutiny.
4. EU policy towards promoting R&D co-operation
The successive Framework Programmes of the EU, covering the “shared cost” type of collaborative
research, have made an important contribution to the development of scientific and technological
cooperation in Europe. The EU involvement in R&D cooperation can be traced back as far as the
Treaty of Rome – establishing the European Atomic Energy Community-, and the other multi-annual
research programmes, carried out either through the Joint Research Centre (JRC) or through funding
to organizations in member countries (Caloghirou & Vonortas, 2000). However, at the beginning of
the 1980s concerns were raised that European firms were falling behind their American and Japanese
counterparts in terms of innovation and world market shares, especially in IT. Therefore, the
Community launched a first Programme (ESPRIT 1) in 1984 to strengthen the scientific and
technological basis of European IT Industry. ESPRIT 1 served as a model for the creation of a more
general ‘’umbrella typed’’ programme, which was called the 1st Framework Programme. The
Framework covered various Programmes in many technological areas, promoting cooperative research
and technological development (RTD). The aim was to link up the diverse and complementary
technical capabilities of companies, universities and research laboratories from different European
countries in pursuit of common technological goals (European Commission, 1997, Peterson & Sharp
1998, Mollina 1996). The main RTD policy instrument of the Framework Programmes has been the
“shared cost” contract research projects, referring to the support by the Commission of 50% of total
costs of joint research for companies, and up to 100 % of marginal and additional costs for universities
and research institutes. Four Framework Programmes have already been completed (1984-1987, 1984-
1991, 1990-1994 and 1994-1998) and the fifth is currently running (1998-2002).
The rationale for cooperative R&D stems basically from competitiveness and market failure issues.
However in Europe political and economic changes have transformed the scene. New members have
already been included in the EU -and many more might be included soon-, and new countries have
emerged. Although the basic policy rationales have not altered, they have been joined with the
cohesion and employment rationales of supporting collaborative R&D. It has been argued that ‘’there
may be a trade-off between competitiveness and cohesion which may decrease the effectiveness of the
Framework Programmes for RTD’’ (Caloghirou, Tsakanikas and Vonortas, 2000). The results of the
FWPs have been rather mixed. On the one hand they have not yet shown a substantial impact on
European competitiveness and trade performance. This could be partially explained by the fact that
collaborative research has been undertaken under the ‘’pre-competitive’’ label. Too often successful
projects did not produce marketable results, either because ‘’they have been isolated from market and
social considerations despite their technical excellence, or because the means by which they were to be
exploited were not specified or even thought about at the earliest stages of work’’ (PREST, 2000)6. On
the other hand they have helped to keep Europe in the technological race.
But the most important effect is that the FWPs have gradually become the driving force behind the
formation of dynamic networks beyond formal collaboration, since they bring together researchers
from the best laboratories in European firms and give private firms the opportunity to benefit from a
larger pool of resources than is available in a single nation. They have unquestionably fostered the
emergence of closer linkages and the creation of a critical mass through networking. In addition, they
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7provide stable financial support; they lead to a reduction of competition among researchers and
between researchers and industry and of course provide access to complementary skills, means and
tools. (Vavakova, 1995; Lucchini 1998). The EU policy towards promoting networking has been
materialized solely through the funding of these research consortia. The success of this policy
instrument (at least at that level) has promted the EU to adopt some additional measures in this
direction: The establishment of multiple transnational networks for technology transfer and
disseminatiuon (CEC, 1994), has also become a significant policy instrument in the last years. In any
case, EU funding of R&D collaboration between organizations from all over Europe still remains the
major policy instrument towards the promotion of networking phenomena, with positive effects
especially on SMEs (Caloghirou & Vonortas, 2000).
5. Data
The Laboratory of Industrial and Energy Economics (LIEE) at the National Technical University of
Athens (NTUA) has developed a new, extensive databank (STEP TO RJVs)7, which includes several
databases with detailed information on collaborative R&D in Europe. The paper draws information
from the EU-RJV database, which contains information on cross-national R&D collaboration
established in Europe through the FWPs8. Two basic criteria for developing this database have been
used. First, we have selected Programmes focusing mainly on industrial research and exclude those
that simply provide support, (e.g disseminate information etc.) or represent other EU actions. The
database includes 64 Programmes from all FWPs, including big and well-known programmes (ESPRIT,
BRITE/EURAM, RACE, etc.) but also some other smaller programmes, through which R&D cooperation
is also perfomed9. Second, (at the project level) we have selected only R&D consortia for which it was
positively identified that they included at least one firm as participant10 (exclud ng e.g cooperation
between Universities).
The implementation of the above citeria resulted to a final inclusion of 9335 research consortia, covering
an extensive period of 16 years, (Sep. 1983 – Dec. 1998). About 20499 organizations from 52 countries
are responsible for 64476 participations in these research collaborations. However, the real value
adding part of this database is the conjunction of this information with financial data on the firm-
participants. Drawing on AMADEUS11, we managed to identify almost 40% of the firms participating
in these consortia. Therefore data for 2722 European firms were retrieved, including sectoral
information (primary activity in NACE 1 and CSO classification) that will be used in our analysis.
                                              
7 The database was constructed in the context of an EU funded TSER project entitled ‘’Science and Technology Policies Towards Research
Joint Ventures’’  (Record Control Number 39084)
8 The primary source of information was CORDIS
9 A complete list of the Programmes included in the database is shown in the Appendix 1.
10 In cases where it was impossible (dute to the poor quality of information) to identify an organization as a firm, we prefered to exclude
them from the database
11 A commercially available database that contains longitudinal financial information for approximately 200.000 European Firms.
86. Estimating knowledge spillovers through R&D co-operation
The basic hypothesis, that was used to compute intra- and intersectoral knowledge flows, is that the
number of co-operative links between firms is a proxy measure for the underlying knowledge flows.
This hypothesis supports the view that ‘learning by networking’ entails more then sharing of
information (i.e. cofified knowledge). If the latter would be the only concern, the network position is,
from an efficiency perspective, more important than the multiplicity of contacts.
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2000) forcefully argue that from a learning perspective, multiple contacts in
interfirm networks will be more effective than pursuing non-redundant contacts, dictated by strict
maximizing efficiency rules. Following an efficiency networking strategy, firms would favour bridge
ties (non-redundant links, overarching structural holes, to central network agents) to multiple and
possibly redundant linkages.
Hagedoorn and Duysters, however, find evidence that in a dynamic environment (in casu the
international computer industry) the absolute number of network links is more relevant than network
status (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2000: p. 23).
We constructed an asymmetric matrix. The asymmetry results from the hypothesis that in R&D
projects more knowledge flows from the partners to the prime contractor than the other way round,
whereas knowledge flows between ‘normal’ partners are assumed to be balanced. The results of a
survey on the impact of the fourth FWP in Finland, show that project coordinators more often than
other participants assesed a project as successful  (Luukkonen and Hälikkä, 2000: p.52). Coordinators
have a central position in the project which, amplified by greater research capacities, probably allows
them to gather and absorb more knowledge from the other participants than the other way about.
Moreover the prime contractor is likely to have more contacts with its partners then the partners
mutually, and hence, to have more learning benefits.
      Box 1: Mathematical definition of spillovers
 A last assumption concerns the issue of ‘intimacy’. As in smaller consortia the knowledge that can be
exchanged , compared to larger and more interspersed ones, is supposed to be of a greater amount we
   Spillover from sector J (all countries) to sector I in country C:
          SPcij = Sn Sk Sl¹k  (Dpc)/NPn [(Pnk Î C AND Pnk Î I AND Pnl Î J) è 1;0]
                     C: country           I, J: sector
                     n: project number
                     k,l = 1... NPn
                            NPn: Number of particpants in project n
                     Dpc = 2 if  Pnk is prime contractor and 1 if not
                     Pnk: k-th participant in project n
  Spillover weighed by domestic sector I’s R&D stock and all countries sector J’s R&D stock:
          SPRDcij = SPcij *(RDci*Sm (RCPcm*RDmj))
                    RDci: R&D stock of sector i in country c
                    m = 1 … number of countries
                    RCPcm: Revealed Comparative Preference (country c-country m)
9assumed knowledge flows to be inversely related to the total number of participants in each project or
agreement.
The spillover measures that were computed are summarized in box1.
To limit the analysis to the most significant sectors, we computed the matrix for the 25 most active
sectors in terms of  participation. This results in matrices with 625 cell values.
From these matrices we computed other matrices in which we weighed the spillover values.
First , following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), we considered that own R&D activities are important to
absorb R&D that spills over. We therefore constructed national sectoral R&D stocks12 from the OECD
ANBERD database and we used the average over the period 1985-95 as a measure of the absorptive
capacity of a given sector.
The second weight concerns the spillover pool.
We used the national sectoral R&D stocks to construct international sectoral R&D pools.
We have used the bilateral measures of Revealed Comparative Preference (RCP),  defined in Dumont
and Meeusen (2000) and used in OECD (1999 b), as weights for constructing this international R&D
pool.
The RCP gives an indication of the relative preference of organizations of a country to co-operate with
partners from a given other country.
So, similar to Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998: p. 339), our spillovers are the product of a measure for the
absorptive capacity with a measure of knowledge sharing.
On the basis of the matrices with weighed spillovers we derived clusters using cut-off criteria, similar
to those Hauknes (1999) used to derive I/O-based clusters for Norway. A first cut-off (link strength)
restricts the linkages on the basis of the fraction of the spillover  from a sector to a given sector in the
total spillover a given sector receives. The second cut-off  (significant sectors) restricts the linkages on
the basis of the fraction of spillover from a sector to a given sector in the total spillover for all sectors
(Hauknes, 1999: pp.63-64).
The clusters that result from this procedure are given in figure 1.
We represent three degrees of linkages. The strongest linkages represent intersectoral spillovers that
are higher than 30 % of the total spillover flowing to the given (encircled sector in figure 1) sector and
higher than 2 % of the total spillover for the given country. These are depicted by the thick arrows. The
weaker linkages represent respectively fractions of 20 %-1% (normal arrow) and 10 %-0.5% (dashed
line).
The technological domains (especially ICT) that the EC promotes through its FWP obviously influence
the pattern of intra- and intersectoral co-operation. The mapping of more near-market collaboration
(e.g. EUREKA) or of private alliances could preclude this bias13.
The policy bias should however not be overstated, as the EC only fixes broad technological areas and
is not concerned with specific sectoral patterns and as, moreover, it is precisely the network pattern
that follows from the EU policy that we want to map.
                                              
12 R&D stocks were computed following the formula given in Coe and Helpman (1995).
13 Data on EUREKA collaboration are also available from the EU-RJV database and could be used in future research. There are also some
datasources on private R&D alliances available (e.g. Merit-Cati).
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Figure 1:    FWP clusters on the basis of weighed spillovers (NACE 2 digit)
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By multiplying two R&D stocks we may overestimate knowledge spillovers of R&D intensive sectors,
and underestimate spillovers to low-tech industries. Some way of normalizing the R&D stocks could
be considered.
R&D intensive sectors that are active in EC-pet technological areas are present in all clusters (i.e.
chemicals (NACE 24) and electronic equipment and components (NACE 32)).
The clusters are probably not very revealing from this perspective.
Even at the two-digit level it can be seen that the clusters show some connection to I/O linkages but
that they cannot simply be reduced to an I/O pattern.
There are important differences between countries as to the sectors that benefit from such knowledge
spillovers.
Figure 1 shows that the clusters are more country specific with regard to user sectors than with regard
to supplier industries.  Moreover, some low-tech industries like food and beverages (NACE 15),
textiles (NACE 17)  and iron, steel and non-ferrous metals (NACE 27) appear in a number of clusters.
Both the weighed and unweighed spillover measures clearly show that in the FWPs co-operation
within the same sector is important, although the two-digit level is too aggregated to conclude from
this that there is a high degree of co-operation between direct competitors.
For a more disaggregated analysis we also computed matrices at the 3 digit level.
Unfortunately, no information on the sector of primary activity is available at the NACE three digit
level.
Therefore we used the CSO three digit level.
We computed matrices of the 40 most active supplier sectors (all countries aggregated) and the 40
most active user sectors (given country), resulting in 1600 cells-matrices.
From these matrices we derived 3 digit clusters with similar but less strict clustering criteria14 as fo
the 2 digit matrices. As no data is available of R&D stocks at the CSO 3 digit level the clusters are
derived from unweighed spillover matrices. The clusters are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 clearly shows the high degree of intra-sectoral co-operation within the FWPs.
As it concerns ‘pre-competitive’ collaboration, this finding should not immoderately warn us against
collusion. The collaboration between competitors at the R&D stage can, as shown theoretically, result
in a welfare optimum when followed by competition at the production stage and could also induce
beneficial standard setting (see for the latter Rycroft and Kash, 1999: p.4). However, policymakers
should remain vigilant to the potential danger of subsidizing (non-additional) R&D activities that
could result in collusive lock-in situations.  Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1991) claim that the FWPs
may have reinforced the shift towards a more oligipolistic IT market in Europe.
One way of sifting this matter is to look at the private networking and market behaviour following
after (and preceding) FWP collaboration (see Dumont and Meeusen 1999, 2000).
The high degree of intrasectoral spillovers conflicts with the finding by Katsoulacos (1993) that the
largest part of FWP co-operation occured between firms of different sectors.
It is noteworthy that the degree of intrasectoral spillovers is significantly higher in larger countries
than in small countries15. This can also be seen in figure 2.
Large countries like the UK, Italy and France have clusters that to a large extent consist of
intrasectoral linkages whereas countries like Austria, Denmark and Finland have far more diversified
clusters.
                                              
14 20 % of sectoral spillover and 1.5 % of total spillover for the strongest links (thick arrows) and 10 % of sectoral spillover and 1.0 % of
total spillover for the weaker links (normal arrows).
15 The correlation between country size and the degree of intrasectoral spillovers is 0.63, which is significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 2: FWP clusters on the basis of unweighed spillovers (CSO 3 digit)
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344
345
343
344
311839
831 790
328
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161
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UK
161
345
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364
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344
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790
364
328
161
345
351
764
330
839
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330
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364
839
224
612
364
839
344
790
345 344
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345
364
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839
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364
361
330
839
SPAIN
161
351
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344
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328
361
364
790
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361
161
839
837 364
839
SWEDEN
344
328
364
974
839
361
940
161 790
345
351
344
351
974
839
837
790
364
161
NETHERLANDS
224
322
353
839
351
162
161
837
257
710
373
343
320
839
313
351
328
162
837
221614
251
710
259
343
320
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This finding could be explained by advisable standard setting and ‘pre-competitive’ co-operation
between MNEs from large countries. However, keeping in mind the model of Pérez-Castrillo and
Sandonís (1996), it could indicate that competitors self-righteously solve the moral hazard of
knowledge sharing through collusive behaviour, and gratefully accept the presented financial support.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we used available data on subsidized R&D collaboration to compute knowledge
spillovers between firms
The underlying motive is twofold.
From a methodological perspective, we argued that data on R&D collaboration may better comprise
knowledge spillovers than methods based on Input-Output tables, as the latter focus on embodied or
rent spillovers.
From a policy perspective, we indicated that the rationale of a public policy oriented towards
promoting interfirm collaboration, irrespective of which theoretical perspective is endorsed, depends
on the magnitude and specificities of spillovers, and that this matter is still open to empirical scrutiny.
The EU launched its ambitious Framework Programmes (FWPs), essentially to foster the catching up
of EU firms to the US and Japan. The FWPs consisted in financial support for transnational
collaboration between firms, higher education institutes (HEI) and research institutes (REC) in what
was labelled as pre-competitive R&D projects, for which exemptions were issued on the strict EU
competition rules.
Data on the FWPs, which are available from an official EU datasource, amplified with firm level data,
were used to compute interfirm knowledge spillovers, assuming that the number of co-operative
interfirm links is a proxy for the underlying knowledge flows.
We hereby endorse a learning perspective which, by focusing on ‘learning by networking’, assumes
that multiple and possibly redundant co-operative links can be more effective than a strict efficiency
perspective.
We constructed matrices for the 25 most co-operating sectors (NACE 2 digit).
We also constructed matrices of weighed spillovers, in which we considered the absorptive capacity
and the spillover pool to be function of sectoral R&D stocks.
Using  the matrices with weighed spillovers we derived clusters of  the sectors with the highest
spillover linkages.
Despite the rather strict cluster criteria, low-tech sectors like  food and b verages; t xtiles; and iron,
steel and non-ferrous metals were present in a number of country clusters.  This might indicate that
low-tech firms use the FWP to find partners that can compensate their lack of own R&D facilities.
Intrasectoral spillovers are found to be important. This conclusion holds when we look at the 3 digit
level (CSO activity code) for which unweighed spillovers were computed.
If, given the ‘pre-competitive’ nature of the FWPs and the theoretical benefits of  co-operation at the
R&D stage, this finding should not necessarily be a warning sign of collusive behaviour, policymakers
ought nevertheless to remain vigilant to promoting and subsidizing R&D activities with little
additionality and/or a potential of creating collusive lock-in situations.
The latter seems even more obvious as there are indications that at least in the European IT market the
FWPs may have reinforced a trend of gradual concentration.
The FWPs should, in our view, be embedded in a more general policy framework that deals, from a
dynamic perspective, with all aspects of co-operation and competition and that acknowledges the
importance of spillovers as a decision criterion for granting subsidies. Jaffe (1996) argues that policy
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support should favour projects with the highest spillover gap, which does not necessarily imply the
highest spillovers. Although the FWPs promote networking, the focus up to now seems to have been
on the R&D aspects of the projects and less on input and behavioural additionality, although the latter
seems crucial from a ‘learning by networking’ perspective as it entails networking that would probably
not occur without support. In his assessment of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which can
be seen as the US counterpart of the EU FWPs, Jaffe gives the following advice which seems as
relevant to the FWPs: “ Finally, to the extent that the policy justification for the ATP lies in creating
spillovers, then any attempt to evaluate the ATP’s success must try to measure those spillovers. Hence
a better understanding of the process will foster the development of data collection and research
efforts that are appropriate to quantification of the spillovers generated by the ATP investments”
(Jaffe, 1996: p.4).
The finding that the degree of intrasectoral spillovers is significantly higher in large countries than in
smaller countries is remarkable and calls for further research.
If the matrices and clusters show some connection with I/O-tables it is also clear that the FWP
linkages do not simply fit in the value added chain.
We think that the proposed method can complement other procedures of measuring spillovers and that
this is interesting both for the empirical issue of measuring or estimating spillovers, as for the issue of
the policy rationale for promoting co-operation, which to a great extent depends on the magnitude and
nature of spillovers.
Further research could be oriented towards another initiative to promote collaboration in R&D. The
Eureka program provides a useful counterbalance for examining whether incorporating more near-
market projects affects the extent, magnitude and sectoral pattern of knowledge spillovers, compared
to the ‘pre-competitive’ EU FWPs. In addition, analysing non-subsidized forms of collaboration  (i.e.
private alliances or strategic technological partnerships) could also provide interesting insights in the
knowledge that is actually shared between partners in the absence of public intervention. The
coincidence and chronological follow-up of linkages in the different types of co-operation (pre-
competitive/ near-market/ market alliances) could also be helpful in establishing the outcome of
network promoting policies, more particularly with regard to potential collusive behaviour.
As the FWP also promote the collaboration of firms with universities and research institutes we could
analyse science-industry spillovers in a similar way as interfirm spillovers.
The spillovers should also be tested econometrically on their significance.
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APPENDIX 1
 Programmes included in the RJV database.
 
Programme Acronym FWP
Number of
Projects
Budget (million
ECUs)
Average funding per
project Criteria
ACTS 4th FWP 154 671 4,36 152
AERO 0C 2nd FWP 28 35 1,25 28
AERO 1C 3rd FWP 34 53 1,56 29
AGRIRES 3C 1st FWP 113 50 0,44 1
AIM 1 2nd FWP 43 20 0,47 36
AIM 2 3rd FWP 44 97 2,20 35
AIR 3rd FWP 436 377 0,86 184
BAP 1st FWP 366 75 0,20 69
BCR 4 2nd FWP 265 59,2 0,22 160
BIOMED 1 3rd FWP 274 151 0,55 3
BIOMED 2 4th FWP 674 374 0,55 146
BIOTECH 1 3rd FWP 156 186 1,19 33
BIOTECH 2 4th FWP 492 595,5 1,21 274
BRIDGE 2nd FWP 97 100 1,03 49
BRITE 1st FWP 219 185 0,84 206
BRITE/EURAM 1 2nd FWP 378 499,5 1,32 303
BRITE/EURAM 2 3rd FWP 472 770 1,63 388
BRITE/EURAM 3 4th FWP 2058 1833 0,89 1453
CAMAR 2nd FWP 80 55 0,69 21
CLIMAT 3C 1st FWP 108 17 0,16 0
CRAFT 3rd FWP 539 57 0,11 216
DECOM 2C 1st FWP 74 12,1 0,16 6
DECOM 3C 2nd FWP 73 31,5 0,43 31
DRIVE 1 2nd FWP 69 60 0,87 67
DRIVE 2 3rd FWP 66 124,4 1,88 59
ECLAIR 2nd FWP 42 80 1,90 41
ENNONUC 3C 1st FWP 789 175 0,22 136
ENS 3rd FWP 14 41,3 2,95 13
ENV 1C 3rd FWP 560 319 0,57 125
ENV 2C 4th FWP 715 914 1,28 222
EPOCH 2nd FWP 34 40 1,18 10
ESPRIT 1 1st FWP 241 750 3,11 234
ESPRIT 2 2nd FWP 435 1600 3,68 380
ESPRIT 3 3rd FWP 605 1532 2,53 483
ESPRIT 4 4th FWP 1599 2084 1,30 834
EURAM 1st FWP 87 30 0,34 62
EURET 2nd FWP 9 25 2,78 9
FAIR 4th FWP 632 739,5 1,17 240
FAR 2nd FWP 127 30 0,24 16
FLAIR 2nd FWP 34 25 0,74 17
FOREST 2nd FWP 38 12 0,32 14
HYMGEN C 2nd FWP 29 15 0,52 4
JOULE 1 2nd FWP 267 122 0,46 143
JOULE 2 3rd FWP 401 217 0,54 286
LIBRARIES 3rd FWP 51 22,5 0,44 35
LRE 3rd FWP 25 22,5 0,90 18
MAST 1 2nd FWP 48 50 1,04 48
MAST 2 3rd FWP 93 118 1,27 34
MAST 3 4th FWP 157 243 1,55 85
MAT 3rd FWP 178 67 0,38 57
MATREC C 2nd FWP 71 45 0,63 67
MHR 4C 2nd FWP 211 65 0,31 0
NNE-JOULE C 4th FWP 577 475
ORA 3rd FWP 19 14 0,74 16
RACE 1 2nd FWP 94 550 5,85 83
RACE 2 3rd FWP 123 554 4,50 118
RADWASTOM 3C 1st FWP 217 62 0,29 30
RADWASTOM 4C 2nd FWP 121 79,6 0,66 40
RAWMAT 3C 1st FWP 236 70 0,30 84
REWARD 2nd FWP 13 6 0,46 11
SMT 4th FWP 394 307 0,78 242
TELEMAN 2nd FWP 21 19 0,90 20
TELEMATICS 2C 4th FWP 641 913 1,42 431
TRANSPORT 4th FWP 336 263 0,78 223
Totals 17596 18709,6 9335
 Source:  Adapted from CORDIS, CD-ROM (1999 III).
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APPENDIX 2 : NACE (revision 1) list of actictivities- primary code (2 digit)
NACE
15 Food and beverages
17 Textiles
23 Cokes, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24 Chemicals
26 Non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 Office machinery and computers
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments;  watches and clocks
34 Motor vehicles and trailers
35 Other transport equipment
45 Construction
50 Sale, repair and maintenace of motor vehicles
51 Wholesale trade (except motor vehicles)
64 Post and telecommunications
73 Research and development
74 Other business activities
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
22
APPENDIX 3 : CSO list of actictivities- primary code (3 digit)
CSO
140 Mineral Oil Processing
161 Production and distribution of electricity
162 Public Gas supply
221 Iron and Steel industry
224 Non-ferrous metals industry
245 Working of stone and other non-metallic minerals n.e.c.
247 Glass and glassware
251 Basic industrial chemicals
255 Paints, varnishes and printing ink
257 Pharmaceutical products
259 Specialised chemical products
311 Foundries
313 Bolts, nuts, …; springs; non precision chains; metals treatment
316 Hand tools and finished metal goods
320 Mechanical engineering
321 Agricultural machinery and tractors
322 Metal-working machine tools and engineers’ tools
328 Other machinery and mechanical equipment
329 Ordnance, small arms and ammunition
330 Manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment
341 Insulated wires and cables
342 Basic electrical equipment
343 Electrical equipment for industrial use; batteries; accumulators
344 Telecommunication equipment; electrical measuring equipment; electronic components
345 Other electronic equipment
351 Motor vehicles and engines
353 Motor vehicle parts
361 Shipbuilding and repairing
364 Aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing
371 Measuring, checking and precision instruments
373 Optical precision instruments
612 Wholesale distribution of fuels, ores,metals and industrial materials
614 Wholesale distribution of machinery, industrial equipment and vehicles
710 Railways
764 Supporting services to air transport
790 Postal services and telecommunications
837 Professional and technical services n.e.c.
839 Business services
940 Research and development
974 Radio and television services
Source : Amadeus (2000)
